



Being backed by extended party networks can mean a greater
chance of electoral success for a Congressional challenger.
Political parties play a central role in democracies, helping to mediate between citizens and
governing elites by running candidates for office who promise to pursue policy programs.  But
what if “the party” is really more of a collection of interest groups than a traditional party
organization?  Using data from US congressional elections and campaign finance, Bruce
Desmarais, Ray La Raja and Mike Kowal show that parties are networks of partisan groups
that converge on select groups of challengers.  They explain that parties in the U.S. have
become so distinctive and polarized, because they represent unique coalitions of policy
demanders that influence the ideological composition of Congress.
In recent years, there has been a re-conceptualization of political parties in the United States.  
Rather than think of them as single organizations, scholars have begun to conceive of them as
dynamic, dispersed systems of interconnected interest groups.  In other words, the “party” is
constituted by an extended partisan network (EPN) comprised of groups that do not necessarily
carry the label Democrat or Republican.   The prevailing theory is that the EPN collectively
pursues the functions of traditional party organizations such as selecting and supporting favored
candidates for office.
We are among the first to test empirically whether EPNs exist and if they actually make a
difference in elections.  Using network analysis with campaign finance data, we find distinctive
communities of groups that converge their political spending on particular challengers.  Moreover,
challengers who find themselves in this selective partisan group do substantially better in
elections than other challengers even controlling for the overall amount of campaign money they
spend.  These findings reveal that conventional accounts of political parties are too simplistic.  Instead, we find
that multiple interest groups – along with the traditional party organizations — perform in coordination the tasks
we typically associate with political parties.
There are at least two important implications of these findings.  First, by showing that political parties are more
than traditional party organizations, we raise a host of questions related to campaign finance reform and other
efforts to regulate parties.  If the party is not simply the Democratic or Republican Party committee, then efforts to
limit party financing as a way of thwarting corruption are greatly complicated.
Second, our empirical finding provides a plausible explanation for why American parties in Congress do not
converge on the preference of median voters (as predicted by Anthony Downs’s economic theory of democracy)
but instead stay well to the ideological left or right of the vast majority of Americans.  Indeed, our findings provide
some clues as to why U.S. parties are increasingly polarized ideologically.
We looked at data on election outcomes and political action committee (PACs) and formal party committee
contributions to all candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives from 1994-2010.  Figure 1 is an example of
the networks we construct from these data, linking committee contributions with candidates in the 2010 elections.
The left graph shows all candidates and the right one shows only winners. The colored dots display candidates
based on party and incumbency status: Democratic incumbents (royal blue), Democratic nonincumbents (light
blue), Republican incumbents (red), and Republican nonincumbents (orange).  In this figure only candidates are
visible (not PACs).  Lines are drawn from the invisible PACs to candidates. As such, candidates with similar
contribution patterns are placed closer together.
Figure 1 – Visualization of contribution to party networks
Note: Networks depict PAC nodes (invisible) connected to candidate nodes, which are
colored based on party and incumbency status. Coloration differentiates four groups:
Democratic incumbents (royal blue), Democratic nonincumbents (light blue), Republican
incumbents (red), Republican nonincumbents (orange). Nodes are placed based on the
algorithm of Fruchterman and Reingold (1991), with edges weighted by the amount
contributed.
This graphic demonstrates that the Republican challengers that ended up winning looked very much like
Republican incumbents in terms of contribution patterns.  That is, the winning challengers in the right graph
received money from similar “communities” of interest groups (in contrast to orange and light blue challengers in
the left graph who appear scattered outside the core).  The same is true from Democrats.   This pattern suggests
strongly that ideologically coherent sets of donors behave very much like traditional parties by backing a selective
group of challengers and helping them win.
Figure 2 shows just how much being integrated in the party network helps. This graphic uses a logit analysis from
our supporting data to generate predictions of challenger success based on whether they are integrated into the
EPN, controlling for all the usual factors that affect electoral outcomes such as political spending.  In this
instance, we assume a typical situation in which incumbent spending is double the challenger spending level.  
The dark line, which represents challengers with party community backing, shows that these candidates
outperform those who do not get party community backing (light line).  So, for example, a party-back challenger
who spends $1.5 million has more than a 30 percent chance of defeating an incumbent compared to a non-party
backed challenger whose chances are less than 15 percent (keep in mind that unseating an incumbent is
extremely difficult).
Figure 2 – Likelihood of challenger winning against incumbent and party community backing
Our results suggest a key interpretation of a role played by political parties.  Parties arise because there are
several political interests in pursuit of narrow policy objectives (e.g., protecting the environment, defending gun
rights). These interests will rarely achieve success if they go it alone. The party forms as a compromise among
non-conflicting political interests in which each group achieves more than would be possible in solitary pursuit, in
exchange for supporting the goals of other party members.  Despite pursuing somewhat disconnected policies,
interests choose to create a long coalition that strives to stay together across time to increase the likelihood that
each will achieve their particular goals. Collectively, these groups identify candidates for office who (1) have
strong electoral prospects, and (2) will deliver on the shared party agenda.
Why do EPN-backed challengers perform better, above and beyond actual spending? It may be due to the
hurdles faced by challengers in convincingly communicating their policy agendas. We argue that when a party
coalition converges on a challenger the coalition’s support sends a strong signal to attentive voters that the
challenger supports the party agenda and stands a good chance of winning.  These voters may have ties with
such groups and comprise a significant portion of the electorate, particularly in primaries and low turnout general
elections.  Another benefit of EPN support is that candidates derive electoral resources – beyond campaign
contributions and group endorsements — in coordination with other groups in the coalition that boost candidate
prospects.
What can these findings tell us about the current state of politics in the US?  We suggest that the high stakes for
control of Congress in the past several decades has strengthened the role of highly partisan and ideological
groups in shaping the overall direction of political parties.  These groups have the means and motive to
coordinate their support for candidates who espouse their views.  Their clout is likely abetted by campaign
finance laws that privilege certain kinds of political organizations.  The end result is that a narrow group of policy
demanders constitute a party that does not necessarily reflect the preferences of rank-and-file party voters, much
less the broader electorate.  We suspect this is one reason why we see members Congress facing policy gridlock
even as the public expresses a desire for greater policy compromise.
This article is based on the paper The Fates of Challengers in U.S. House Elections: The Role of Extended Party
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